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"JORDAN FIRST": JORDAN'S INTER-ARAB
RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER
KING ABDULLAH II
Curtis R. Ryan
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN has long played a
regional foreign policy role that seems to belie its small size and its limited
economic and military means.' That role in no way diminished even after the
succession in the Jordanian monarchy from King Hussein to his son Abdullah in
1999. But with the death of Hussein and the accession to the throne of King
Abdullah II, Jordan did nonetheless have a new top foreign policy maker for the
first time in 46 years. On 9 June 2004, the Hashemite monarchy celebrated the
fifth anniversary of Abdullah's reign. This date marked not only five years of
rule for the new regime, but also five particularly tumultuous and violent years
in regional politics - from the collapse of the peace process, to the renewed
Palestinian Intifada, to U.S. wars against both Afghanistan and Iraq.
Yet throughout these turbulent events, Jordan has continued to play a
key role in the prospects for both war and peace in the region. The May 2003
summit in Jordan's capital, Amman, between President George W. Bush, Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas
underscored the centrality of the Jordanian role in particular in attempts to
revive the moribund peace process.
In June 2003, the World Economic Forum held a special summit at
Jordan's Dead Sea resort, underscoring the Jordanian regime's determination to
court the world's most wealthy and powerful economic actors, while also
demonstrating the central role that these economic "powers-that-be" seem to
attach to Jordan within Middle East politics. Later that same month, the
"Quartet" of officials from the U.S., United Nations, European Union, and
Russia again chose to meet in Jordan in an attempt to implement their
"Roadmap for Peace." For better or worse, the major powers of the early 21"
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Century seemed to regard Jordan as geo-politically far more important than its
size or resources might otherwise suggest. This paper provides an analysis of
Jordanian foreign policy under King Abdullah II, particularly within inter-Arab
and Middle East politics, as the regime has attempted to maneuver between
domestic and regional challenges.
Since ascending the throne in 1999, King Abdullah has strengthened
Jordan's international ties to major extra-regional powers such as the United
States and the European Union, and has further linked the kingdom's fortunes to
major intemational economic institutions, such as the Intemational Monetary
Fund and the World Trade Organization. Closer to home, Jordan has maintained
its peace treaty with Israel, despite the collapse of the Oslo peace process and
the start of the second Palestinian Intifada. In inter-Arab relations, Jordan under
King Abdullah has managed to complete the long and difficult process (since the
depths of the 1991 Gulf war) of reestablishing relations with each of the Arab
Gulf monarchies. The kingdom has developed a close relationship with
Washington's other major Arab ally, Egypt, as King Abdullah and Egyptian
President Husni Mubarak positioned their respective regimes to be major
mediators within Middle East politics.
In the sections that follow, this paper examines Jordan's inter-Arab
relations under King Abdullah II, with an emphasis on the two most problematic
and contentious relationships: with Syria and with Iraq. The paper then
examines Jordan's newly stabilized inter-Arab and regional relations against the
context of renewed crises in the region, as the kingdom has been wedged
between violence to the west, between Israelis and Palestinians, and to the east,
between the United States and Iraq. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the
domestic implications of Jordan's regional position and its foreign policy
choices.
JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER KING ABDULLAH II
King Hussein had seemed to many in the outside world to be the virtual
embodiment of Jordan and its foreign relations.^ For the most part. King
Abdullah's policy views mirror those of his father. He too is moderate and
cautious and is determined to maintain close alliances with Jordan's tradition
Western allies. Abdullah is even more committed to economic liberalization
than his father was, although a major question remains regarding his stance on
domestic political liberalization. Interestingly, while Abdullah cannot yet have
his late father's experience and clout on the world stage, neither does he suffer
from the animosities aroused by King Hussein. Abdullah, unlike the long-
serving Hussein, did not come of political age in the most intense days of the
global Cold War or even of the regional ideological conflicts of the 195O's and
196O's.̂  This is not to say that Abdullah's personal political socialization was
unaffected by regional conflict. To the contrary, Abdullah appears to have been
deeply affected by Jordan's difficult experience in the 1990-91 Gulf war, for
example. But unlike his father, Abdullah is not influenced by the heady days of
the Arab Cold War, nor is he personally affected by the scars of the 1970-71
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Jordanian civil war or by the long rivalry between King Hussein and various
Arab leaders.'' As one of Jordan's former foreign ministers put it:
The major issue that isn't noticed in our relations
with other Arab countries was, well, King Hussein was an
ambitious man. He inherited the philosophy of the Arab revolt,
the ancestry of the Prophet Muhammad, and his grandfather's
vision he shared of uniting the Arabs with Jordanian
leadership and with the Hashemite family. King Abdullah
does not claim to be king of all the Arabs. Just the king of
Jordan. So these people - Syria, Palestinians, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia - are not as edgy as they were with King Hussein.
They are not threatened by Abdullah. There was always that
anger that Abdullah I, and then King Hussein, was jumping
ahead of himself Especially with the Saudis. They feared
what the ambitions might be.̂
Almost immediately after becoming king, Abdullah made clear his
interest and indeed aptitude for foreign policy, by embarking on a series of trips
to key capitals to shore up intemational support for his regime and for Jordan.
Underscoring his central concern with Jordan's economic development,
Abdullah had within the first six months of his reign visited the leaders of each
of the Group of Seven (G-7) states - the world's seven most industrialized and
most wealthy countries. Perhaps more surprisingly, however, the young king
also toured the Arab Gulf states and even made a point of visiting Libya and
Syria - states that had often had tenuous relations with Jordan under King
Hussein.
» Despite Jordan's importance to war and peace in the region, from
Palestine to the Persian Gulf, the literature on the kingdom's foreign policy
remains sparse. A few works, however, have delved deeply into the economic
underpinnings of Jordanian policy, into the social construction of Jordanian
identity itself, and into the contested nature of that identity - and hence of
policy - in the Jordanian public sphere.^ Jordan's foreign policy is certainly also
influenced strongly by its geographic position and its relative weakness vis-a-vis
its neighbors. The Kingdom is clearly economically, politically, and militarily
weaker than any of its neighbors and this has given rise to a politics of
vulnerability, manifested in a cautious and conservative approach to foreign
policy making.' As Bassel Salloukh has argued, Jordanian foreign policy under
King Hussein was based in large part on concerns for regime legitimacy,
consolidation, and survival.*
These overriding concerns with regime survival have not vanished with
the succession in the monarchy to King Abdullah IL Indeed, paramount among
all considerations, I argue, is the political economy of Hashemite regime
security in understanding Jordan's changing foreign relations under King
Abdullah. Jordan's economy is deeply indebted and entirely dependent on
foreign aid from key external benefactors, especially the United States.' There is
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even a certain redundancy of pressures built into the global political economy
since for Jordan and so many other countries the major sources of economic aid
(the U.S., European Union, and Japan) happen also to have the majority of votes
within powerful global economic institutions such as the Intemational Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. The redundancy issue continues even to the world of
private banking or corporate foreign investment, since most global banks and
indeed most of the world's foreign investment capital is also concentrated in the
U.S., Westem Europe, and Japan. In short, small indebted countries like Jordan
tend to be inherently constrained in their foreign policy decision-making.
Jordan, to be blunt, cannot afford to alienate its creditors and its sources of
foreign aid.
Yet at the same time Jordan's economy, like all economies, still runs on
oil. Hence an additional economic concem is the kingdom's oil supply source.
In the context of the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq, however, the economic pressures
were contradictory, since all of Jordan's oil came from Iraq, while the
kingdom's dependency on U.S. and even British foreign aid was also clear. But
for Jordan the oil issue was not just a matter of being entirely dependent on a
single country as a source; rather, it also tumed on the lucrative nature of the
specific Jordanian-Iraqi oil deal. Iraq provided Jordan with 100 percent of its oil
supply, to be sure. But just as importantly, half that supply was provided for
free, while the other half was provided at severely reduced prices (usually half
price). For Jordan, the question then became not only one of alternative
suppliers, but also one of whether any other supplier would provide the kingdom
with this kind of concessionary deal - and the kingdom's budget is not set to
accommodate any other kind of arrangement.
For these reasons the kingdom is intent on preserving its economic
links to global powers, and also on restoring and deepening its economic
connections to regional states such as the "oil kingdoms" - the Arab monarchies
of the Gulf. Because of its stance during the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan suffered
from the economic backlash of these same states. Saudi Arabia had in particular
severed foreign aid, cut all oil supplies to the kingdom, and expelled more than
300,000 Jordanian guest workers. Jordan had also suffered from a brief
cessation of U.S. and European economic aid in the aftermath of that same
crisis.'" It is worth noting here that both circumstances still haunt Jordanian
policymakers."
King Abdullah appears to be particularly determined to ensure that
such a political-economic rift will never again emerge in Jordan's relations with
the West or with the Gulf. It took several years for Jordan to reestablish its
relations with the Arab Gulf states after the 1991 Gulf war. Jordan restored flill
diplomatic relations with Qatar in 1994, and reestablished full diplomatic ties
with Saudi Arabia only in 1995. But even earlier that same year King Fahd had
refused to meet with King Hussein when the latter was in-country for a
pilgrimage. It would not be until 1996 that the first face-to-face meetings would
occur between the Jordanian and Saudi monarchs since the 1991 Gulf war. In
sum, Jordanian govemment officials remain wary of future such diplomatic —
and more importantly economic - rifts with major extemal benefactors. These
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overriding concerns with the political economy of Hashemite regime security
continue severely to constrain Jordanian foreign policy, including during the
2002-03 crisis and war with Iraq.
King Abdullah, for his part, has attempted to lessen Jordan's
dependence on foreign aid by increasing the domestic productive capabilities of
the economy. This has led the king's teams of economic planners to focus
especially on foreign investment, joint ventures, and trade as the key factors in
Jordan's economic development. The very makeup of the Jordanian govemment
reflects these priorities, as more and more top officials, including Prime Minister
AH Abu al-Raghib himself, are neoliberal technocrats who share King
Abdullah's vision of a Jordan rich in information technology and productive
private capital. Thus as important as economic factors have been in Jordanian
policy in the past, they are even more important to Jordan under King Abdullah
II. According to one of Jordan's former cabinet ministers, "it is development
that defines King Abdullah. And that right there explains Jordan's relations with
the Gulf countries. It's about development."'^ These economic concerns
provided strong incentives for the new king to solidify existing bilateral
relations, while also repairing the rifts that had emerged between Jordan and its
main economic partners or patrons.
Yet with the political economy of regime survival appearing to drive so
many Jordanian foreign policy shifts, it must also be noted that these have
carried domestic costs. The Abdullah regime, like that of Hussein before it, has
placed paramount importance on economic links and security concerns, often at
the expense of the program of domestic political liberalization. All controversial
foreign policy moves in recent years have been accompanied by further retreats
from Jordan's domestic political liberalization process.'^ In the current climate
of regional crises, for example, from renewed Intifada in the West Bank and
Gaza, to renewed U.S. war against Iraq, Jordan's parliamentary elections were
repeatedly postponed. National parliamentary elections had been held in 1989,
1993, and 1997 with a fourth round due in November 2001.'" Those elections
were rescheduled to the summer, then the fall of 2002, and were soon more than
a year overdue. The elections finally did take place, however, in June 2003 in
the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war and in the context of attempts to revive the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
As Schwedler has noted, it seems clear that these electoral
postponements would have occurred even without the additional security
concerns that followed the 11 September 2001, attacks on the United States. The
deliberalization process seemed to be well underway in the immediate aftermath
of the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. The renewed Palestinian uprising, coupled
with fears of renewed war in the Persian Gulf, only added to that process. In
Schwedler's view, "the events of September 11 did not so much change the
course of domestic politics in Jordan as accelerate them by providing a
Washington-friendly justification for increased political repression."'^ Jordanian
foreign policy, therefore, must be seen as walking the tightrope between
domestic, regional, and even global constraints. But by the same token, the
regime's interest in the economics of its own security tends to take precedence
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in both domestic and foreign policy over all other considerations. 1 will now tum
to an analysis of Jordan's changing relations with Syria and Iraq, before
retuming to the domestic implications of the regime's own slogan: "Jordan
first".
JORDAN'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
Within regional and inter-Arab relations, the Jordanian-Syrian
relationship has been among the most volatile. Jordan and Syria fought as (at
least nominal) allies in the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, but more often
acted as rivals in regional politics."^ In 1970, with the outbreak of the Jordanian
civil war or the "Black September" conflict between the Hashemite armies and
PLO guerrilla forces, Syria had launched an unsuccessful invasion of northem
Jordan. That invasion failed for three main reasons: Jordanian military
resistance, Syrian intra-regime rifts that prevented air cover from supporting
Syrian ground troops, and finally, Israeli threats to intervene on the side of the
Hashemite monarchy against Syria. Yet only a few years later, in 1975, Jordan
and Syria had allied together - this time in a very real sense — and had achieved
fairly extensive levels of political and economic cooperation. By 1980, however,
they had de-aligned once again with intense recriminations and saber-rattling on
their mutual border. Jordan had by this time shifted to an alliance with Iraq and
throughout the 198O's Jordan supported Iraq while Syria supported Iran in the
eight-year long Iran-Iraq war. The two states differed again during the 1991
Gulf war, when Syrian troops deployed in Saudi Arabia as part of the U.S.-led
coalition, while Jordan opposed foreign intervention (and was thus viewed by
some in the U.S. govemment as collaborating with Iraq)."
Jordan and Syria, in short, seemed doomed to find themselves on
opposite sides of major conflicts from the Gulf wars throughout the global Cold
War. Adding to the usually frosty relations between the two states was the
personal animosity of the respective rulers. There was certainly no love lost
between King Hussein and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. But by 1994, King
Hussein's decision to pursue a full peace treaty with Israel confirmed the worst
suspicions in Damascus that Jordan, like Egypt before it, would opt for a
separate bilateral peace with Israel. In Asad's view, this marked yet another
departure from the ranks of a united Arab front against Israel.
Despite Syrian hostility, the Jordanian regime signed on to the
Washington-sponsored Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. While Asad in particular
made clear his displeasure, the reaction from Damascus was nonetheless rather
subdued. Syria did not support Jordan's move, but neither did it indulge in
recriminations such as those that had followed from Anwar Sadat's separate
peace between Egypt and Israel. Unlike Sadat's Egypt, Jordan was not expelled
from the Arab League, nor did it suffer from a pan-Arab embargo. The
difference here was the 1993 Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO. With
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations already underway, the Jordanian peace treaty
with Israel became part of a broader regional process, and most importantly
followed the Palestinian move, unlike Sadat's more unilateral "defection" from
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Arab ranks. Still, the peace treaty did nothing to ameliorate Jordanian-Syrian
tensions, and relations between Jordan and Syria remained positively frigid for
several years.
When King Hussein passed away' in 1999, he and President Asad had
never really reconciled. Yet to the surprise of many Jordanians, Asad arrived in
Amman with a large entourage to march in King Hussein's funeral procession
and to pay his respects to the late king's son and heir, Abdullah. Asad's presence
also served another purpose, by allowing the Syrian president to meet directly
with other key world leaders, at a time when U.S. and European leaders were
otherwise unlikely to travel to Damascus.
Within inter-Arab relations, however, Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement
may have begun at that very moment. Within the year. President Hafiz al-Asad
had also passed away, and despite the seeming blur between republic and
monarchy, he too passed power on to his son. With both states under new
leadership for the first time in decades, the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement was
fully underway. President Bashar al-Asad and King Abdullah II already knew
one another and had met on several occasions. In some ways they are similar:
both in their mid-thirties, both interested in computers and communications and
changing their societies, and both succeeding a leader that served so long that
most citizens remembered no other.
The warm personal rapport of Bashar and Abdullah has certainly
helped bring Jordanian-Syrian relations to one of their closest points ever. This
has been further enhanced by strong pro-Syrian constituencies in Jordanian
politics that have long viewed warm Jordanian-Syrian relations as the "natural"
order of things. In the absence of the personal rivalries and the opposite stances
that had characterized the Cold War and the Iran-Iraq war, Jordan no longer
seems to have to choose between aligning with either Syria or Iraq. While the
Jordanian-Iraqi relationship did indeed suffer in the mid- and late 199O's, that
was not attributable to warming Jordanian-Syrian ties, and indeed even that rift
did not extend to Jordan under King Abdullah. For some policy makers, such as
former foreign minister Tahir al-Masri, a key component of this change is not
only the new leadership in Damascus and Amman, but also the changes
following the peace treaty with Israel:
For our relations with Syria, it's natural it would get
better because the two old pillars have disappeared and with
that came two new leaders, without the same inhibitions. And
they're the same age and generation ... Now, Jordan has
diluted its role in the region. There is no clear role to play
now. It used to be that good relations with Syria meant Iraq
was angry with you, or good relations with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia was angry with you. But with Jordan's diminishing
role and the disengagement from the Palestinian cause and
issue, and the real and genuine acceptance that Arafat and the
PLO or PNA represents the real entity called Palestine, there is
now no reason to have a quarrel with Jordan over this.'^
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While Jordan's peace with Israel did indeed change the strategic
conditions of regional politics, this is not to say that the move was met with
universal acceptance. Jordanian-Syrian relations had already been strained for
years, and that relationship predictably deteriorated still further following the
Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The fall of 1998, for example, saw a particularly
virulent barrage of attacks against Jordan within the state media in Syria,
especially in a series of statements by Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas,
who accused Jordan of having been entirely co-opted by Israel. Tlas managed
also to jab the Hashemite regime over what he saw as an emerging Jordanian-
Israeli-Turkish alliance, and he even complained of Jordan's limited
commitment to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.''
Following the death of King Hussein in 1999, however, the two
countries' bilateral relations began to improve. In that year, both countries
revived the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, marking the first such
organized meeting in more than a decade. In 2000, King Abdullah and President
Bashar al-Asad exchanged a series of state visits to each other's capitals, thereby
pushing the warming trend still further. Each bilateral summit produced further
evidence of cooperation, especially in trade and other economic issues.
As noted above, however, Jordan's various foreign policy links -
especially those with Westem countries, the Gulf monarchies, and even Israel —
are not only of political but also of paramount economic importance to the
regime. Jordan is dependent not only on financial aid, but also on external
sources of water. That fact, for example, was an incentive in securing a peace
treaty with Israel in the first place, but it is also an incentive in maintaining that
treaty, and with it, access to water transported from Israel to Jordan. But even
then, with droughts and politics intervening to reduce the amount of water sent
from Israel, the kingdom had to tum to Syria in the summers of 1999, 2000,
2001 and 2002 for additional water supplies. The Jordanian-Syrian entente, in
short, quickly proved valuable in at least partially alleviating the kingdom's
chronic water shortages.
But beyond the specific questions of water supplies or indeed even of
Jordanian-Syrian relations, it is clear that external ties are seen as so
economically vital to the kingdom; the regime has tended to exhibit limited
tolerance for domestic opposition to its foreign policy decisions. This is
especially noticeable in the continuing rift between the government and the
political opposition over the peace treaty with Israel. Opposition forces have
continued in their campaign to halt normalization of ties with Israel, a campaign
led largely by the professional associations - that is, the organizations within
Jordanian civil society that represent specific professions such as pharmacists,
engineers, lawyers, medical doctors, joumalists, and so on. These associations in
tum overlap to some extent in membership and outlook with numerous political
parties, such as the Islamic Action Front and various leftist and pan-Arab
nationalist parties.
With the second Intifada beginning in 2000, that campaign gathered
steadily more domestic political support and soon came to encompass public
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anger over U.S. threats against Iraq. As Lynch has argued, this led to an
unusually powerful and pervasive consensus in Jordanian domestic politics
against U.S. support for the Israeli occupation and against U.S. military threats
to neighboring Iraq. The consensus had in tum led to a boycott of U.S. goods in
the kingdom, including the many U.S. fast food restaurants that have multiplied
especially across Amman. The level of popular dissatisfaction, and of
government unease, is reflected in increasing Jordanian military deployments in
civilian areas in anticipation of unrest, in what some opposition leaders have
described as "occupied Amman."^^
What escaped the notice of many outside of Jordan, however, was that -
- despite their many differences -- the regimes in Damascus and Amman were
actually in general agreement with one another on some major foreign policy
issues. At least verbally and officially, Jordan and Syria both supported the
Palestinian Intifada against the Israeli occupation and both opposed the U.S.
invasion of Iraq, albeit in varying degrees. Jordanian-Syrian relations, in short,
now bear no resemblance to the "Cold War" that so long characterized their
international interactions.
I will return to the domestic consequences of Jordan's precarious
intemational maneuvering in the concluding section of this article, but first I will
tum to Jordan's other tumultuous relationship within Arab regional politics - the
kingdom's relations with Iraq.
JORDAN'S CHANGING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ
Like its relationship with Syria, Jordan's relations with Iraq shifted
dramatically many times over the years. This becomes especially clear if we
note how close the two countries' relations had been for more than a decade
preceding the ill-fated Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. As the two original
Hashemite monarchies established in the Middle East by Britain, following
World War One and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Jordan and Iraq had
initially maintained close relations based on family ties. This ended when the
Hashemite royal family in Iraq was overthrown and killed by dissident military
officers in the 1958 coup d'etat. Not surprisingly, in the years that followed the
two regimes became unalterably hostile to one another. But by the late 197O's,
Jordan and Iraq had drifted together once again, building a bilateral alliance that
would last through the 1991 Gulf war. In 1979 Iraq initiated contacts aimed at
closer alignment at a time when the newly established President Saddam
Hussein was seeking Arab allies, perhaps to provide for at least some level of
transnational support and inter-Arab legitimacy for his regime.^' More important
for the Jordanians, however, were the economic pay-offs of such an alliance:
Iraq could provide economic support and oil supplies that the kingdom
desperately needed.̂ ^
But as the new alliance began to solidify in 1980, Saddam Hussein's
military forces invaded Iran and King Hussein in particular immediately backed
Iraq against the revolutionary Islamist regime in Iran. The Hashemite
govemment viewed Iran as a potential threat not from military expansion, but as
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a supporter and living example of Islamist revolutionary militancy against
conservative pro-Westem monarchies. For King Hussein, Iran was a threat not
just to his regime's security directly, but also indirectly in so far as it threatened
the Arab Gulf monarchies on which Jordan was partially reliant for aid.̂ ^
Throughout the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, Jordan supported Iraq politically and
especially economically. Indeed, Jordan's port of Aqaba and its overland
trucking routes became Iraq's main supply line throughout the eight long years
of that war. In retum, Jordan received oil from Iraq at prices far below market
To expand on these political-economic linkages, Jordan helped create
the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in 1989, in the immediate aftermath of the
Iran-Iraq war. The ACC alliance of Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Yemen was meant
to facilitate capital and labor flows between members while also allowing them
to act as a fairly formidable lobbying bloc within inter-Arab politics in their
mutual efforts to renegotiate their debt terms with the Arab Gulf monarchies.
Despite strenuous Jordanian efforts to prevent it, that alliance evaporated in the
heat of the 1990-91 Gulf war."
As the United States recruited Arab countries to join its coalition
against Iraq in 1991, Jordan tried to steer a middle course between Baghdad and
Washington. The Hashemite Kingdom thereby attempted to maintain both its
U.S. and Iraqi alliances, while King Hussein engaged in ultimately unsuccessful
attempts at mediation. In the end, Jordan's Gulf war position alienated most of
the kingdom's allies and especially damaged relations with the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Arab Gulf monarchies. The context of these
Jordanian decisions, in domestic politics and political economy, is vital to
understanding the Jordanian position. In the year before the Iraqi invasion,
Jordan had helped assemble the ACC that had served to deepen the already
existing Jordanian-Iraqi alignment. In domestic politics, the kingdom had been
rocked by political upheavals following the implementation of an Intemational
Monetary Fund adjustment and austerity program.^^ The 1989 IMF riots made
clear the regime's domestic political and economic vulnerability, but also led the
monarchy to initiate a program of political liberalization that included national
parliamentary elections and looser restrictions on the media. The newly
liberalized atmosphere, however, also served to amplify public opinion, which
was hostile to any Jordanian or U.S. move against Iraq.̂ ^
Jordan's foreign policy decisions must therefore be seen against this
backdrop of change. Domestic opinion, now able to be more vocal than ever
before, was overwhelmingly supportive of Iraq against any foreign coalition.
Decision-makers were certainly influenced and constrained by the public
response, but they were also concemed that tuming against Iraq would mean
losing the country's largest local ally, its largest trading partner, and its main
source of oil imports.^* As a result of these calculations, Jordan did indeed steer
a middle course: it refused to join the coalition, but also refused to send its
troops to defend Iraq. Similarly it rejected Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and called
for withdrawal, but also rejected the legitimacy of an intemational - rather than
an inter-Arab - solution to the crisis. In the end, Jordan's stance satisfied no one
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and temporarily cost the kingdom its lucrative economic ties to the U.S., the
United Kingdom, and the Arab Gulf monarchies. The latter states further
penalized the kingdom not only by cutting off oil and aid supplies, but also by
expelling hundreds of thousands of Jordanian and Palestinian guest workers.'^'
Jordan's 1991 Gulf war decision had therefore led to severe economic,
social, and political costs. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the regime
attempted to recoup some of these losses by playing on the kingdom's geo-
strategic role and its critical importance to any hope for Arab-Israeli peace. In
1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf war, Jordan quickly agreed to
participate in the regional peace conference in Madrid. The process eventually
led to the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, but not to stability or peace for the
region.
The mid-1990's, however, also marked a new low point in Jordanian-
Iraqi relations. By 1995, King Hussein had broken publicly with Iraq and
allowed Iraqi opposition groups to organize and set up offices in Amman.
Jordan even gave asylum to Saddam Hussein's daughters and sons-in-law when
they temporarily defected from Iraq. As has occurred during every Jordanian-
Iraqi rift, regional rumor mills and assorted tabloids put forward the theory that
Jordan intended to revive Hashemite claims to Iraq - something the Jordanian
govemment has always denied, and would again feel compelled to deny as late
as 2003. In 1997, Jordan expelled Iraqi diplomats following the execution in
Baghdad of several Jordanian merchants accused of smuggling. During this
heated period, each govemment accused the other of meddling in its domestic
affairs, with verbal charges punctuated by the violent episodes noted above. The
rift, however, proved nonetheless to be short-lived and in the final years of King
Hussein's reign, Jordanian-Iraqi relations began to become warmer.
Following the 1999 succession in the Jordanian monarchy. King
Abdullah called - in his first speech before parliament - for an end to the United
Nations embargo on Iraq. In 2000, Jordan became the first Arab country
officially to break the embargo by sending planes of medical supplies and later
high-level govemment delegations to Baghdad. After Jordanian airliners began
landing in Baghdad, numerous other countries followed suit. Jordan and Iraq
softened their diplomatic rhetoric toward one another and agreed to resume Iraqi
shipments of oil to Jordan at concessionary prices. The improved Jordanian-
Iraqi relationship did not amount to a new alliance, but the foreign policy shift
was nonetheless extremely significant, for it signaled an end to the brief period
of open hostility that had marked the late 199O's.̂ °
Even before retuming to warmer diplomatic ties, Iraq and Jordan had
maintained functional and pragmatic economic cooperation despite their
diplomatic rift. By the late 199O's, the lack of an economic windfall from Israel
had pushed Jordan and Iraq back together at least at the economic level. Iraq
remained the sole source of Jordan's oil supply, while Jordan's port of Aqaba
remained practically Iraq's only lifeline to the outside world as the UN sanctions
regime continued.^' Thus the economic symbiosis between the two states, while
problematic for several years, managed to survive the Israeli peace treaty.
54 Arab Studies Quarterly
Rebuilding diplomatic (and more importantly economic) bridges
between Jordan and Iraq capped the overall trend in Jordanian policy under
Abdullah to restore or improve relations with each of Jordan's neighbors, with
the Arab world in general, and with non-Arab regional and global powers. With
the tumultuous 198O's and 199O's finally behind them, the Jordanians had
achieved (albeit briefly) greater stability in foreign relations than perhaps ever
before. Specifically, the kingdom's relations with all of its neighbors ranged
from stable to warm, with extra-regional connections to Western powers and
global economic institutions stronger than ever. This moment of stability would
last barely two years, however, for although Jordan's official state-to-state
relations were stable, the same could not be said of the regional political climate.
Despite solid foreign relations, Jordan remained wedged between escalating
Israeli-Palestinian violence to the west and heightened fears of renewed U.S.-
Iraqi warfare to the east.
9-11 AND AFTER: JORDAN AND THE "WAR ON TERRORISM"
Following the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
the already strong Jordanian-U.S. link grew stronger still. The kingdom backed
the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and later
sent Jordanian troops to participate in peacekeeping operations there. Within the
Jordanian press, stories had even circulated claiming that the govemment had
uncovered and foiled a plot, linked to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda
organization, to assassinate Jordan's royal family itself.̂ ^ The immediate impact
of these events led to even closer U.S.-Jordanian relations, including the
Congressional vote to approve the U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement - the
first free trade agreement between the U.S. and an Arab country. Jordan even
managed to secure a doubling of its foreign aid package from the United States,
elevating the kingdom to one of the top recipients of U.S. aid, behind Israel,
Egypt, and Colombia. Yet in the context of rising Palestinian and Iraqi casualty
tolls (in the former case from Israeli forces, and in the latter case from the
sanctions regime and the later U.S. invasion), Jordan's seemingly unwavering
support of the U.S. carried potentially severe domestic costs. The rift between
state and society was indeed wide, and steadily growing.
Given the rising regional crises, many Jordanian officials feared the
nightmare scenario of an Israeli mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West
Bank across the Jordan river. Similarly, to the east, the regime feared being
dragged into a U.S.-Iraq war. Among many other objections, they feared that
massive numbers of Iraqi refugees might fiow westward into the kingdom,
joining the hundreds of thousands of dissident Iraqis already there. They may
also have feared potential U.S. pressures to allow American forces to launch
combat missions from the Jordanian desert into western Iraq. The domestic
implications of the regime joining an unprovoked attack on another Arab
country, especially one that had suffered so much under the sanctions regime,
were dire to say the least.
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For these reasons. King Abdullah and the Hashemite regime repeatedly
made clear their opposition to any strike on Iraq. The Jordanians were joined in
this by a veritable chorus from other U.S. regional allies such as Egypt, Tunisia,
and Saudi Arabia, as well as even more fervent opposition from their new ally,
Syria. Contradictory press reports charged that the regime opposed absolutely
any strike, and also that the regime was negotiating secret deals to allow strikes
to take place from Jordanian soil.̂ ^ These latter reports also charged that
economic factors remained a major sticking point, with the regime making clear
the need for an altemative oil supplier if Iraqi supplies were to be disrupted.'''' In
the end, Jordan did allow the deployment of U.S. Patriot anti-missile batteries in
its eastem dessert, but the regime insisted that no U.S. combat operations were
launched from Jordanian soil and that the U.S. military deployment was
minimal, defensive, and temporary. As noted earlier. King Abdullah was also
determined not to have Jordan suffer the same outcome that had occurred after
the 1991 Gulf war. Jordan, like most other Arab states, did not join the U.S.
coalition - which in effect meant that the coalition was in real terms a bilateral
combined operation of the United States and the United Kingdom.
In January 2003, when the World Economic Forum held its annual
meeting in Davos, Switzerland, King Abdullah was the only Arab head of state
to address the conference. In doing so, the king made clear Jordan's opposition
to war with Iraq, but also his skepticism that it could be avoided given U.S.
military preparations. He also reiterated, however, his concern that the real
unresolved issue in Middle East politics was the Palestinian-Israeli confiict, and
not any issue in the Gulf region.̂ ^
"JORDAN FIRST"
As suggested in the title of this article. King Abdullah's domestic and
foreign policy may best be summarized in the regime's own slogan: "Jordan
first" {al-Urdun Awalan). While this suggests a strong nationalist approach to
foreign policy, it has also been used to counter "foreign" infiuences within
Jordanian domestic politics. King Abdullah has, for example, personally
criticized the intemational ties of many of Jordan's core opposition parties, from
both pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi Ba'thist parties within the kingdom, to the
Communist party, to the Islamic Action Front. In King Abdullah's words:
The programs, objectives, membership and financing
of every party operating in Jordanian territory ought to be
purely Jordanian ... In recent decades, Jordan has given
priority to Arab interests and not to its national interests ...
We have a right to be concemed first for our own people, as
every country in the world does, which is where our "Jordan
first" slogan comes from.̂ ^
The nationalist tone, in short, applies not just to foreign policy, but also
to domestic politics. In actual practice, however, this means that many forms of
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political opposition, whether on the secular left or religious right, can potentially
be categorized as un-Jordanian. Even before the "Jordan first" public relations
campaign began, dissident voices were silenced through arrests of joumalists,
political party activists, and professional association officials critical of the
regime. Dissidents as diverse as independent Islamist Layth Shubaylat and
feminist activist Tujan al-Faysal (the only woman elected to parliament prior to
2003) were in separate cases arrested, convicted of various anti-regime remarks,
and released. But having been convicted, neither major opposition figure is
eligible to run for a seat in parliament.
In August 2002, the regime signaled the limits to its tolerance of
criticism by the satellite television station Al-Jazeera, by shutting down the
station's Amman office. The offending program had involved an interview with
U.S. scholar Asad Abu Khalil, who had criticized the late King Hussein for
being too close to Israel and to the United States even before the 1994 peace
treaty. According to Muhammad Afash Adwan, Jordan's minister of
information, Al-Jazeera had crossed a line in a way that "continuously intends to
harm Jordan and its national stands whether directly or indirectly" and "in a way
which confirms that its main goal is to create disturbance ... and provoke
sedition.""
Within the kingdom itself, meanwhile, unrest had re-emerged once
again in the south of Jordan, particularly in the city of Ma'an - the scene of
widespread rioting against IMF austerity programs in 1989 and 1996, as well as
widespread demonstrations against U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1998. In 2002,
Ma'an was once again a focal point for opposition, but interestingly the city
seems to be seen simultaneously as a bedrock of traditional Hashemite support,
as a hotbed of Islamist activity, and also as a center for pro-Iraqi Ba'thist
activity. Ma'an, in short, is continually socially reconstructed, but always with
emphasis on extemal sources of opposition.^* Jordan's intelligence service, or
mukhabarat, apparently believes that this is not just a matter of indigenous
Islamist activity, but rather of outside agitators. These were represented as either
Al-Qa'eda infiuenced Saudis, who cross from the nearby Saudi border, or as
veterans of Afghani fighting who had re-emerged in Jordan after the fall of the
Taliban regime in the 2001-2002 U.S.-Afghani war. During earlier unrest in
1996 and 1998, the mukhabarat had charged that local pro-Iraqi Ba'thist agents
were stirring unrest and violence in the same location. As before, the regime
response has involved not only the police, but also the regular army. Troops
sealed off the town completely before moving through key neighborhoods in
force, killing six people, and arresting more than 100.
The November 2002 raid and military deployment in Ma'an followed
the October 2002 assassination of American diplomat Lawrence Foley. Foley
had been shot to death outside his home in Amman. Jordanian forces since that
time have attempted to round up the militants responsible. But whether the
domestic military operation in Ma'an was truly aimed at religious
fundamentalists or secular leftists, at criminal smuggling syndicates or foreign
militants, the appearance in a Jordanian town of soldiers, tanks, and helicopter
gunships invoked the same images as the unrest of 1989, 1996, and 1998.
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Jordanians drew comparisons not just to these earlier events within Jordan, but
also to Israeli repression in the Intifada?^ Given the level of force used to quell
Ma'an, the Hashemite regime may have been attempting to curb dissent in
general, in anticipation of the looming U.S. war against Iraq. Indeed the
govemment has repeatedly issued decrees with new restrictions on publications,
public demonstrations, and various other aspects of civil society. From 1999 to
2003 alone, the government issued well over 100 such "temporary" laws. In
Jordan, as elsewhere, the state emphasis on security and the "war on terrorism"
have been used to justify numerous aspects of de-liberalization.
CONCLUSIONS
As this essay has attempted to make clear, Jordan under King Abdullah
II has placed a premium on stabilizing and strengthening its inter-Arab and other
regional relations. The regime has in many respects succeeded in these
endeavors, despite the fact that external events - from the Intifada, to 9-11, to
U.S.-Iraqi hostility - threaten to tear down all that the new regime has achieved.
And in its external relations, at least, Abdullah's regime has achieved many of
its goals. These include in particular establishing stronger ties with its traditional
Western allies and with the main global economic institutions. These key
intemational alignments are based in very large part on the regime's perceptions
of Jordan's economic interests. Jordan under King Abdullah solidified its
alliances and its aid links to the United States and the United Kingdom, while
also strengthening ties to the European Union as a whole and working closely
with the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. King Abdullah spent
a great deal of time in key westem capitals lobbying not only for raising aid
levels and restructuring debt repayments, but also for increased foreign
investment. Jordan's economic development plans and the king's speeches
continually emphasize the importance of foreign investment not just in Amman,
but throughout the country. This includes the establishment of special free
economic zones, such as one in southem Jordan at Aqaba. In many respects, the
official message from the Jordanian regime, at venues such as the World
Economic Forum and elsewhere, is that Jordan is open for business. But as
Greenwood has argued, this strategy seems to be aimed also at mollifying and
co-opting key constituencies such as Transjordanians and the business
community."*"
In this context, Jordan had furthermore repaired its formerly ruptured
ties with Arab states from Iraq to Syria to Egypt to each Arab Gulf monarchy -
all while preserving its peace treaty with Israel and its military links to Turkey.
Yet none of these alliances and alignments was able fully to insulate Jordan
from the ripple effects of the resurgent Palestinian uprising against Israeli
occupation, terrorist attacks on the United States, and the U.S. war with Iraq.
None of these alignments, despite the economic gains that they sometimes
entail, can shield the regime from its own population should stability in the
region continue to collapse. Since as early as 1994, extemal crises have for too
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long provided the cause, or the excuse, for stagnation of the political
liberalization process within the kingdom, and even for active deliberalization.
Thus in the current context of severe regional instability, the regime's
already established tendency to allow political liberalization to take a back seat
to all other priorities is only exacerbated, rendering the successes in foreign
policy dubious in the end. "Jordan first", in short, may also amount to "regime
security first." But regime security cannot be purchased through external
alliance alone, or solely through foreign aid or foreign investment. To achieve
real security, for both state and society in Jordan, a revitalization of the political
liberalization process is absolutely essential. In that regard, the kingdom's June
2003 parliamentary elections (originally scheduled for November 2001 but
postponed several times) were certainly a step in the right direction.'"
The national parliamentary elections were the first since 1997, the first
since the dissolution of parliament in 2001, and the first in the reign of King
Abdullah II. The elections took place in the context of electoral laws that
introduced a new system of magnetic voting cards, reduced the voting age from
19 to 18, and increased the number of parliamentary seats to 110 (including a
new quota of 6 seats to guarantee minimal representation for women). The new
laws also maintained the pattern of uneven electoral districts, tilting
representation toward more conservative rural areas and away from urban
centers of Palestinian or Islamist strength. Not surprisingly, the poll results
yielded a parliament dominated by a clear majority of tribal and pro-regime
candidates. There is, however, at least minimal representation for the opposition,
which had returned to electoral participation after having boycotted the 1997
elections. For example 17 parliamentary seats went to the Islamic Action Front
and four to independent Islamists.''^
But the key question remains whether these elections mark a new
beginning in the political liberalization process, or if they were simply an end in
themselves. For all Jordanian democracy activists, the hope is that this marks the
resumption of genuine liberalization, largely stalled since 1994. By the same
token, however, these same advocates of democracy also fear that this may
amount to mere cosmetic change, as has been the norm in the past. Much will
depend on how the new parliament itself approaches its role, and whether it
tackles key issues such as reforming the electoral laws as well as laws on the
press, publications, public demonstrations and other aspects of a more vibrant
civil society. In the meantime, the regime of King Abdullah II is indeed well
positioned to play a particularly productive regional role, both in reviving a
more meaningful peace process and in helping dissuade its powerful U.S. ally
from still further wars in region. But in concert with such key foreign policy
challenges, the greater security of the Hashemite regime will hinge on its
commitment to reviving and deepening the once-impressive political
liberalization process at home.
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